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INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATORS’ DUTIES TO 
NON-PARTIES 
PERRY S. BECHKY* 
The notion that arbitrators owe duties to the parties in investor-state disputes 
is familiar.  This article explores less-trodden terrain.  It argues that, 
notwithstanding the party-centric norms of arbitration, investment 
arbitrators also owe duties to non-parties.  It begins by establishing a 
beachhead – a clear example of a duty to a non-party, as a proof of concept 
– before moving into rougher territory.  The article catalogs and surveys 
various duties owed to non-parties, discussing the nature of these duties and 
how they are enforced.  Finally, the article shows that recognizing duties to 
non-parties both informs a proper understanding of the investment 
arbitration system and may help improve that system.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitrators in investor-state disputes plainly owe duties to the parties to 
the case before them.  They are appointed to do a job, and they must do that 
job and do it well: competently, diligently, ethically, expeditiously, fairly, 
impartially and independently, and properly.  They must act with sound 
judgment, due care, and an open mind. 
But, do investor-state arbitrators also owe duties to anyone else?  If so, 
what duties do they owe and to whom?  From where do such duties originate?  
Given that party autonomy is a hallmark of arbitration, can duties to non-
parties ever prevail over the will of the parties?  How are such duties 
enforced?  And, what does the existence of duties to non-parties mean for 
the system of international investment arbitration? 
The infamous decision in Loewen v. United States shows why these 
questions need attention.  The tribunal found that a Canadian investor 
suffered a “miscarriage of justice” resulting in a jury verdict in Mississippi 
of $500 million, but nevertheless ruled that this injustice did not deny the 
investor “fair and equitable treatment.”1  Years later, the arbitrator appointed 
by the United States said that the U.S. government “put pressure” on him to 
ensure that it prevailed in the case.2  By accepting his appointment under 
such pressure, the arbitrator deprived the claimant of a just process.  Yet, the 
harms do not end with the claimant.  Loewen further denied Canada the 
benefit of its bargain under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”), which was supposed to give Canadian investors access to 
“impartial tribunal[s].”3  The ruling also harmed the system of investor-state 
arbitration, calling into question its ability to deliver impartial justice.  And, 
 
 1.  Loewen Grp. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶¶ 54, 101, 137, 217, 241–42 
(June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005). Some of the literature criticizing Loewen is listed in JAN 
PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION 160, 160 n.27 (2013). 
 2.  David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an 
Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 405 (2010). Schneiderman quotes 
the arbitrator recalling the following conversation with the U.S. Department of Justice: “You know, 
judge . . . if we lose this case we could lose NAFTA. Well, if you want to put pressure on me . . . then 
that does it.” Id. 
 3.  North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1115, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
605 [hereinafter NAFTA] (establishing an investor-state arbitration system that “assures . . . due process 
before an impartial tribunal”). 
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as Jan Paulsson rightly concluded, the case “subvert[ed] larger interests,” 
including “advancing the international rule of law.”4 
The Loewen example shows that, while investment arbitration was born 
from a party-centric tradition, tribunal rulings affect non-parties.  Scrutiny is 
needed of the responsibilities the arbitrators owe those outside the room. 
Like others exercising public authority, investment arbitrators must 
respect the interests of all affected by their decisions.  This article thus 
situates investment arbitrators within the trend towards “other-
regardingness” in global administrative law.5  Recognizing arbitrators’ 
responsibilities to others should influence the behavior of arbitrators 
themselves, as well as arbitral institutions and states.  In other words, 
increasing other-regardingness may help deliver the reform that investment 
arbitration needs. 
Part II opens by illustrating a duty to a non-party: tribunals in cases at 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) 
owe ICSID, a non-party, the duty to issue written, reasoned awards.6  Part III 
then addresses other duties that investor-state arbitrators owe to arbitral 
institutions, notably ICSID.  Part IV examines arbitrators’ duties to non-
party participants in investment cases, including other states and non-
governmental organizations.  Part V introduces the concept of systemic 
duties of investor-state arbitrators.  Arbitrators owe systemic duties not to 
particular persons, but to the creators of the investment arbitration system 
(states) and its ultimate beneficiaries (the global public).  Part VI discusses 
why it is important to recognize the duties investor-state arbitrators owe to 
non-parties.  Part VII concludes by reflecting on arbitrators’ fundamental 
duty of good faith.7 
II. DUTY TO GIVE REASONS 
The ICSID Convention requires arbitrators to produce an award in 
writing.8  Further, “[t]he award shall deal with every question submitted to 
the Tribunal, and shall state the reasons upon which it is based.”9 
 
 4.  PAULSSON, supra note 1, at 162. 
 5.  See infra Part VI. 
 6.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, art. 48(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (“The 
award of the Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by the members of the Tribunal who voted 
for it.”). 
 7.  This article addresses arbitrators’ duties originating from applicable treaties (especially the 
ICSID Convention and investment treaties), international law, and arbitral rules. It does not address duties 
that may arise from national law. 
 8.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6. 
 9.  Id. art. 48(3). 
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ICSID arbitrators thus have a duty to write reasoned awards.  This duty 
is “quite unequivocal,” “mandatory,” and “not subject to the parties’ 
disposition” – it cannot be waived or varied, not even by mutual agreement 
of the parties.10  The drafters of the ICSID Convention considered whether 
to allow parties to waive the requirement of reasons, but rejected that 
position by “a large majority” because “the reasons were seen to be too 
important to allow the parties to waive them.”11 
Its fixed nature shows that the duty to provide reasons is not owed only 
to the parties.  It is also owed to ICSID itself.  The duty arises from ICSID’s 
founding charter,12 and reflects ICSID’s institutional commitment to 
reasoned awards, a firm choice that outweighs even the ethos of party 
autonomy.  The International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) makes the 
same commitment to reasons.13  In contrast, the London Court of 
International Arbitration (“LCIA”), the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(“PCA”), and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”) require 
written awards but allow the parties to opt out of reasons.14 
The ICSID Convention creates a mechanism to enforce the duty to write 
reasoned awards: an award may be annulled if it “has failed to state the 
reasons on which it is based.”15  This enforcement mechanism is weakened, 
to be sure, by the fact that it is available only if a party requests annulment16 
– a limit that suggests that, in theory, the parties and tribunal could jointly 
depart from the requirement of reasons.  Nevertheless, this is less potent than 
 
 10.  CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 996, 998 (2d ed. 
2009). 
 11.  Id. at 820, 996. 
 12.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 48(3). 
 13.  Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Arbitration Rules, art. 32(2) (Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter 
ICC Rules]. 
 14.  Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce [AISCC], Arbitration Rules, art. 
42(1) (Jan. 1, 2017) [hereinafter SCC Rules] (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall make its award in writing, and, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, shall state the reasons upon which the award is based.”); London 
Court of Int’l Arbitration [LCIA], Arbitration Rules, art. 26.2 (Oct. 1, 2014) [hereinafter LCIA Rules] 
(“The Arbitral Tribunal shall make any award in writing and, unless all parties agree in writing otherwise, 
shall state the reasons upon which such award is based.”); Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA], 
Arbitration Rules, art. 34(2) (Dec. 17, 2012) [hereinafter PCA Rules] (“All awards shall be made in 
writing . . . .”); Id. art. 34(3) (“The arbitral tribunal shall state the reasons upon which the award is based, 
unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given.”); see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE 
LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, arts. 31(1)–(2), U.N. 
Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW] (“The award shall state the reasons 
upon which it is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is an 
award on agreed terms under article 30.”). 
 15.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 52(1)(e). For an introduction to ICSID annulment 
proceedings and the role of ad hoc committees, see generally Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes 
[ICSID], Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative Council of ICSID (Aug. 10, 2012). 
 16.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 52(1). 
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it appears.  It only protects an unreasoned award where both parties refrain 
from requesting annulment.  Christoph Schreuer argues that, “[a]n agreement 
between the parties to the effect that reasons need not be stated would be 
invalid and would not preclude a subsequent application for annulment on 
this ground.”17 
Moreover, ICSID can informally enforce the reasons requirement 
through its power of appointment.  ICSID appoints all members of 
annulment committees, presidents of tribunals in cases where the parties 
cannot agree, and non-presiding arbitrators in cases where a party (usually 
the respondent) fails to appoint an arbitrator.18 An arbitrator who failed to 
produce a reasoned award, in violation of the ICSID Convention, could 
hardly expect to secure future appointments.  The threat of losing future 
appointments creates a powerful compliance incentive. As Catherine Rogers 
has observed, institutional control over appointments is “the primary means 
through which arbitrators are regulated.”19  In the case of ICSID in particular, 
this power is enhanced by both the prestige and number of ICSID 
appointments. 
To conclude, the duty to write reasoned awards arises from the ICSID 
Convention.  It serves ICSID’s institutional interests.  It cannot be waived or 
varied.  It can be enforced by ICSID.  It should therefore be understood as a 
duty owed to ICSID.  This is not to claim that the duty of reasoned awards 
is owed only to ICSID.  It serves party interests,20 and it is enforceable by 
the parties.  It is best understood as a mixed duty, owed to both the parties 
and ICSID. 
 
 17.  SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 10, at 996–97 (quoting Maritime Int’l Nominees Establishment 
v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 5.10 (Dec. 22, 1989), 4 
ICSID Rep. 79 (1997)). One may speculate what would happen if a party agreed to an unreasoned award 
and then requested annulment for lack of reasons—perhaps annulment of the unreasoned award plus an 
assignment of costs against the party for prolonging and complicating the case. 
 18.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, arts. 37(2)(b), 38. Such appointments are made by the 
President of the World Bank, acting in the President’s capacity as Chairman of the ICSID Administrative 
Council. Id. art. 5. 
 19.  CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 240 (2014). 
 20.  See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 
(1978) (“By and large it seems clear that the fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by 
reasoned opinions. Without such opinions the parties have to take it on faith that their participation in the 
decision has been real, that the arbiter has in fact understood and taken into account their proofs and 
arguments.”) (emphasis added); Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment of Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport 
Services Worldwide, ¶ 250 (Dec. 23, 2010) (“Reasons are important to the legitimacy of the decision. . . 
. The parties will want to assure themselves as to how the Tribunal reached its conclusions and whether 
such conclusions can be challenged before an ad hoc committee.”) (emphasis added). 
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III. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL DUTIES 
As seen in Part II, when an arbitral institution mandates rules that 
cannot be waived or varied by the parties, the institution strongly signals the 
existence of duties owed to the institution itself.  Thus, this Part considers 
other fixed rules that institutions impose on arbitrators, the institutional 
interests these rules serve, and how the rules are enforced.  Specifically, it 
examines three categories of fixed rules: (a) the duty to perform fundamental 
responsibilities, a category that includes a number of specific 
responsibilities; (b) the duty to follow institutional requirements; and (c) the 
duty of jurisdictional policing. 
A. Duty to Perform Fundamental Responsibilities 
Owen Fiss has articulated the central duty of judges, equally apt to 
arbitrators: they must listen and then they must speak.21  A tribunal must 
neither speak (i.e., render a decision) without truly listening to the parties’ 
arguments and evidence nor, having finished listening, fail to speak.22 
Simply rendering an award may be the most basic responsibility of a 
tribunal, but rendering an award is not enough.  Tribunals have an 
overarching duty to produce an award that is valid and enforceable, which 
requires that the award follow from a fair process.  As stated by the ICSID 
tribunal in Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, d.d. v. Slovenia (HEP), “The 
Tribunal’s obligation as guardian of the legitimacy of the arbitral process is 
to make every effort to ensure that the Award is soundly based and not 
affected by procedural imperfection.”23  The ICC, LCIA, and SCC similarly 
require that the tribunal “shall make every effort to make sure that the award 
 
 21.  Owen M. Fiss, Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979) (“The judge is 
required to listen and to speak, and to speak in certain ways.”). Fiss added: 
The judge is entitled to exercise power only after he has participated in a dialogue . . . . with 
very special qualities . . . . (b) Judges do not have full control over whom they must listen to. 
They are bound by rules requiring them to listen to a broad range of persons or spokesmen. (c) 
Judges are compelled to speak back, to respond to the grievance or the claim, and to assume 
individual responsibility for that response. (d) Judges must also justify their decisions. 
Id. at 13. 
 22.  Speaking without listening first is grounds to annul an ICSID award: 
[T]he Tribunal’s [order] . . . was incompatible with the fundamental obligation on the Tribunal 
to permit both parties to present their case in relation to the new material. . . . The Tribunal 
ought not to have proceeded to analyse and consider this evidence itself in its deliberations 
without having afforded the parties the opportunity to make submissions on it, and availed itself 
of the benefit of those submissions. 
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, ¶ 230. 
 23.  Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, d.d. v. Republic of Slovn., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Tribunal’s 
Ruling, ¶ 15 (May 6, 2008), 24 ICSID Rev. 201 (2009). 
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is enforceable at law.”24  And the Restatement on International Arbitration 
also mentions an arbitrator’s “duty to render an enforceable award.”25 
Support for the idea that arbitrators have an overarching duty to perform 
their fundamental responsibilities can also be seen in the debate over the 
scope of immunity that arbitrators should enjoy from civil liability.  Susan 
Franck, for example, proposed allowing for civil liability against arbitrators 
in two circumstances: 
(a)  An arbitrator shall be liable if she/he unjustifiably fails to render an 
arbitral award.  (b) An arbitrator shall be liable for bad-faith conduct done 
in his/her capacity as an arbitrator.  Bad-faith conduct may involve an 
intentional act that is based upon, but not limited to, fraud or corruption.26 
The LCIA and SCC both allow civil liability in limited circumstances.27  The 
Restatement, which reflects the dominant position in U.S. law, adheres to 
 
 24.  ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 42; accord id. art. 34 (requiring the ICC Court to approve a draft 
award “as to its form” and also allowing the Court to “draw [the tribunal’s] attention to points of 
substance”); LCIA Rules, supra note 14, art. 32.2 (“For all matters not expressly provided in the 
Arbitration Agreement . . . the Arbitral Tribunal . . . shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that any 
award is legally recognised and enforceable at the arbitral seat.”); SCC Rules, supra note 14, art. 2(2) 
(“[S]hall make every reasonable effort to ensure that any award is legally enforceable.”). 
 25.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV’R-STATE 
ARBITRATION § 4.13, Reporters’ note d (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2019). The Restatement 
takes the position that a tribunal’s material deviation from procedures agreed upon by the parties may 
warrant invalidation by a reviewing court. Id. § 4.13. Explaining the concept of materiality in this context, 
the Restatement argues: 
[A] court may consider whether such deviation was a justifiable exercise of arbitrator 
discretion. For example, an intentional deviation from the parties’ agreed-upon procedures to 
protect the safety of the parties, to ensure the enforceability of the award, or to comply with the 
mandatory law of the seat (a violation of which might trigger set aside of the award) would not 
ordinarily be considered a material violation of the parties’ agreement. Although such deviation 
may violate certain provisions of the parties’ agreement, it arguably is intended to serve the 
parties’ larger purposes in submitting their dispute to arbitration and within the arbitrators’ 
discretion and duty to render an enforceable award. 
Id. § 4.13, Reporters’ note d (emphasis added); see also id. § 4.13 cmt. d. 
 26.  Susan D. Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and 
Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 58 (2000). 
 27.  See LCIA Rules, supra note 14, art. 31.1 (barring arbitrator liability except when there is 
evidence of “conscious and deliberate wrongdoing”); SCC Rules, supra note 14, art. 52 (barring arbitrator 
liability except for acts or omissions attributable to “wilful misconduct or gross negligence”). While 
UNCITRAL allows arbitrator liability for “intentional wrongdoing” and the PCA Rules are rooted in the 
UNCITRAL Rules, the PCA departs on this point by precluding arbitrator liability “to the fullest extent 
permitted under the applicable law.” Compare U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, art. 16 (2013) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules], https://uncitral.un.org/ 
sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/uncitral-arbitration-rules-2013-e.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/6B9T-5XJM] (excluding “intentional wrongdoing” from parties’ wavier of arbitrator liability), 
with PCA Rules, supra note 14, art. 16 (“[Stipulating] parties waive [arbitrator liability], to the fullest 
extent permitted under the applicable law . . . .”). The ICC aligns with the PCA in affording arbitrator 
immunity except as “prohibited by applicable law.” ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 41. 
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absolute immunity,28 but notes that some U.S. courts have allowed arbitrator 
liability for “failure to render an award” or “when arbitrator misconduct is 
so extreme that any arbitral outcome is not part of a legitimate deliberative 
process.”29 
The duty to perform is owed to parties, of course – failure deprives the 
parties of the process they establish and pay for.30  It is owed to institutions 
as well.  As Rogers observes, institutions exercise regulatory powers over 
arbitrators to “ensure[] that institutions are not obliged to administer 
arbitrations that are likely to produce unenforceable awards or otherwise 
lack legitimacy,” because “the interests and functions of arbitral institutions 
are beyond mere facilitation of party preferences.”31  Indeed, institutions 
have a paramount interest in ensuring the legitimacy and enforceability of 
 
 28.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV’R-STATE 
ARBITRATION § 3.10. The Restatement goes so far as to confirm expressly that absolute civil (but not 
criminal) immunity holds even where arbitrators engage in such gross misconduct as bribery. Id. § 3.10 
cmt. b, illus. 2. An earlier draft of the Restatement flirted with cabining immunity, suggesting that 
arbitrators could be held accountable for “failure to perform fundamental duties (such as failing to render 
an award)” and for breaching “related implied obligations to refrain from extreme misconduct that 
endangers the validity of the award or its enforceability.” RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3.10 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft 9 2016) (emphasis added). 
The draft added, “arbitrators and arbitral institutions are employed through contractual arrangements . . . 
.” Id. “Although the precise contours and nature of the arbitrator’s contract remain somewhat amorphous, 
the contract unequivocally involves remuneration in exchange for certain services and the obligations 
that accompany them.” Id. (emphasis added). The final Restatement dropped this language, apparently 
due to pragmatic concerns. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & 
INV’R-STATE ARBITRATION § 3.10, Reporters’ note a (arguing that absolute immunity prevents collateral 
attacks on awards and encourages individuals to serve as arbitrators); Caroline Simson, Restatement 
Looks to Resolve Divisive Int’l Arbitration Issues, LAW360 (Nov. 20, 2019, 9:57 PM), https:// 
www.law360.com/articles/1222072/restatement-looks-to-resolve-divisive-int-l-arbitration-issues [https: 
//perma.cc/ZY5M-JDJM] (citing Catherine Rogers, an associate reporter of the Restatement, who 
attributed the change to concerns about the difficulty of obtaining insurance for arbitrator liability). Even 
without admitting civil liability for breaches, however, the final Restatement continues to recognize 
arbitrators’ core “duty to render an enforceable award.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF 
INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV’R-STATE ARBITRATION § 4.13, Reporters’ note d. 
 29.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV’R-STATE 
ARBITRATION § 3.10, Reporters’ note b (quoting Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d 
1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding no immunity for “failure to decide” because the arbitrator “has simply 
defaulted on a contractual duty to both parties”), aff’d on other grounds, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 30.  Cf. Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV. 
151, 154 (2004) (“[A]rbitrators are private professionals retained to perform services.”); REDFERN AND 
HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION para. 5.49 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 6th ed. 2015) (“The 
parties to an arbitration entrust an arbitral tribunal with an important task for which they are prepared to 
pay–often quite generously. They therefore expect the arbitrator to perform the task with due care and 
there exists an obvious moral duty for him or her to do so. The question is whether there is also a legal 
duty.”). The ensuing discussion shows that Redfern and Hunter equate “legal duty” with civil liability 
and answer that liability is available for at least some serious failures to act with due care in all countries 
but the United States. Id. paras. 5.49–.55. 
 31.  ROGERS, supra note 19, at 82 (emphasis added). 
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awards issued under their auspices.  No arbitral institution could survive if 
its awards came to be perceived as illegitimate or unenforceable.32  
Institutions depend on voluntary consent by potential parties and are thus 
(like arbitrators themselves) “dealing in virtue.”33  To paraphrase Iago: good 
name in an arbitral institution is the jewel of their souls; he that filches the 
institution’s good name makes it poor indeed.34 
Arbitrators cannot be allowed to subvert an institution’s reputation for 
integrity – even if they act according to the parties’ agreement.  To guard 
against grave negative externalities, party autonomy must yield to the 
institution’s needs.  This is a classic case for regulatory intervention. 
Accordingly, institutions impose non-variable duties to ensure that 
arbitrators perform their fundamental responsibilities.  Some of those 
responsibilities are reviewed below: (1) the duty to judge fairly; (2) the duty 
of impartiality and independence; and (3) the duty of diligence. 
1. Duty to Judge Fairly 
ICSID mandates that “each arbitrator shall sign a declaration” in an 
exact specified form, which pledges: 
I shall judge fairly as between the parties, according to the applicable law, 
and shall not accept any instruction or compensation with regard to the 
proceeding from any source except as provided in the [ICSID Convention] 
and in the Regulations and Rules made pursuant thereto.35 
ICSID enforces the declaration requirement through a simple 
mechanism: “Any arbitrator failing to sign a declaration by the end of the 
first session of the Tribunal shall be deemed to have resigned.”36  Plus, 
 
 32.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV’R-STATE 
ARBITRATION § 3.10, Reporters’ note b (quoting In re Nat’l Forum Trade Practices Litig., 704 F. Supp. 
2d at 837) (“[I]nstitutional immunity may not apply and suit may proceed based on allegations of 
‘systemic, pervasive, and far-reaching allegations of bias and corruption, rendering every single 
arbitration performed by provider suspect.’”). 
 33.  See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996) 
(explaining how reputation for virtue aids in the competition for arbitral appointments). 
 34.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. Let us leave aside here the question of Iago’s 
sincerity. 
 35.  Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], The Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings (The Arbitration Rules) of ICSID, r. 6(2) (Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter ICSID Rules] 
(emphasis added). ICSID has proposed a thorough update of its rules, but this article only notes the 
proposals where they would work substantive changes relevant to the arbitrators’ duties. See generally 
Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules (Feb. 28, 
2020) [hereinafter ICSID Proposals]. The proposals would make the arbitrator declaration more detailed 
and specific, preserving the obligation to “judge fairly.” Id. at 241. 
 36.  ICSID Rules, supra note 35, r. 6(2) (emphasis added). ICSID has proposed to replace the 
deemed-resignation rule with another enforcement mechanism: failure to sign the declaration prevents 
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failure to judge fairly is grounds for annulment.37  ICSID also presumably 
enforces the obligation to judge fairly through control of subsequent 
appointments – a breach of this core responsibility would call into doubt 
whether the arbitrator has the characteristics needed for appointment, “high 
moral character and recognized competence.”38 
Similar commitments to basic fairness dot the arbitral landscape.  
Historically, some ancient Greek arbitrators swore, “By Zeus and Lycian 
Apollo and Earth, I will judge the case . . . in accordance with the justest 
judgment. . ..”39  Likewise, the Jay Treaty of 1794 required arbitrators to 
“solemnly swear (or affirm)” to decide all cases “according to Justice and 
Equity.”40  Today, the ICC and LCIA both oblige arbitrators to “act fairly,” 
with the LCIA expressly wrapping its rule in the language of arbitrator’s 
duties.41  The LCIA highlights the institutional nature of this duty of fairness 
by empowering the LCIA Court to remove an arbitrator who acts unfairly 
“upon its own initiative.”42 
 
acceptance of the appointment and triggers a process to make a new appointment. ICSID Proposals, supra 
note 35, r. 19(3)–(5), at 39. 
 37.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, arts. 52(1), (3). At least three grounds for annulment may be 
implicated by an arbitrator’s failure to judge fairly, at least where the failure is sufficiently serious: 
annulment where “the Tribunal was not properly constituted,” where “there was corruption on the part of 
a member of the Tribunal,” and where “there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure.” See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 10, at 979–91. 
 38.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, arts. 14(1), 40(2), 57. 
 39.  GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 742 (2d ed. 2015) 
(quoting MARCUS NIEBUHR TOD, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AMONGST THE GREEKS 115–16 
(1913)). 
 40.  Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. 6, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116 
[hereinafter Jay Treaty] (“Commissioners . . . shall . . . take the following Oath or Affirmation . . . -viz.- 
I . . . do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will honestly, diligently, impartially, and carefully examine, 
and to the best of my Judgement, according to Justice and Equity decide all such Complaints . . . and that 
I will forbear to act as a Commissioner in any Case in which I may be personally interested.”). 
 41.  LCIA Rules, supra note 14, art. 14.4 (“[T]he Arbitral Tribunal’s general duties at all times 
during the arbitration shall include: (i) a duty to act fairly and impartially as between all parties, giving 
each a reasonable opportunity of putting its case and dealing with that of its opponent(s) . . . .”); ICC 
Rules, supra note 13, art. 22(4) (“In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall act fairly and impartially and 
ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present its case.”). 
 42.  LCIA Rules, supra note 14, art. 10.1 (“The LCIA Court may revoke any arbitrator’s 
appointment upon its own initiative, at the written request of all other members of the Arbitral Tribunal 
or upon a written challenge by any party if . . . that arbitrator . . . becomes . . . unfit to act . . . .”); id. art. 
10.2 (“The LCIA Court may determine that an arbitrator is unfit to act under Article 10.1 if that 
arbitrator . . . does not act fairly or impartially as between the parties . . . .”). 
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2. Duty of Impartiality and Independence 
The arbitrator’s duty of impartiality and independence is a cornerstone 
of investor-state arbitration, like all international arbitration.43  The 
International Bar Association (“IBA”) ethical guidelines describe “[a] 
fundamental principle . . . that each arbitrator must be impartial and 
independent of the parties . . . during the entire course of the arbitral 
proceeding.”44  This principle is widely reflected in institutional rules,45 and 
its historical antecedents reach back at least as far as the Jay Treaty.46  
Moreover, institutions routinely enforce this obligation by requiring every 
arbitrator to disclose – both initially and throughout the case – any 
circumstances that could “give rise to reasonable doubts” about the 
arbitrator’s impartiality and independence.47 
Institutions are so concerned with preserving the impartiality and 
independence of tribunals operating under their auspices that “several 
institutions also reserve to themselves the right to refuse to appoint an 
arbitrator that the institution deems is unsuitable, even if the parties have 
agreed to the appointment.”48  For example, the ICC and LCIA confirm 
arbitrators nominated by the parties, and those institutional checks expressly 
address the nominees’ impartiality.49  Although ICSID does not scrutinize 
 
 43.  See, e.g., Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID] & U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 
[UNCITRAL], Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, art. 3, para. 
27 (May 1, 2020) [hereinafter Draft Code] (describing impartiality and independence as “key to every 
system of justice”). 
 44.  Int’l Bar Ass’n Res. IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, at 4 
(Oct. 23, 2014). 
 45.  See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 11(1) (“Every arbitrator must be and remain impartial 
and independent of the parties involved in the arbitration.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 14, art. 5.3 (“All 
arbitrators shall be and remain at all times impartial and independent of the parties; and none shall act in 
the arbitration as advocate for or representative of any party.”); PCA Rules, supra note 14, art. 11, annex 
(“I am impartial and independent . . . and intend to remain so.”); SCC Rules, supra note 14, art. 18(1) 
(“Every arbitrator must be impartial and independent.”). The English version of ICSID Convention 
Article 14 refers to “independent judgment,” while the Spanish version mentions “imparcialidad de 
juicio,” leading to the conclusion that “Article 14 encompasses challenges made on the basis of the 
absence of independence or impartiality.” See Meg Kinnear & Frauke Nitschke, Disqualification of 
Arbitrators Under the ICSID Convention and Rules, in CHALLENGES AND RECUSALS OF JUDGES AND 
ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 50 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2015). 
 46.  See Jay Treaty, supra note 40, art. 6. I thank Bjorn Arp for this observation. 
 47.  See ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 11(2); see also ICSID Rules, supra note 35, r. 6; LCIA Rules, 
supra note 14, arts. 5.4–.5. 
 48.  ROGERS, supra note 19, at 82. 
 49.  ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 13(2) (“The Secretary General may confirm . . . persons 
nominated by the parties . . . provided that the statement they have submitted contains no qualification 
regarding impartiality or independence or that a qualified statement regarding impartiality or 
independence has not given rise to objections. . . . If the Secretary General considers that a [nominee] . . . 
should not be confirmed, the matter shall be submitted to the Court.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 14, art. 
7.1 (“If the parties have agreed howsoever that any arbitrator is to be appointed by one or more of them . . . 
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party appointments in this manner, it nevertheless requires that arbitrators 
must be “persons of high moral character . . . who may be relied upon to 
exercise independent judgment,”50 and enforces that requirement through the 
mandatory declaration, institutional appointments, annulments, and other 
mechanisms discussed above.  Moreover, all the institutions have 
mechanisms for disqualifying arbitrators who are not, or cease to be, 
impartial and independent.51 
The duty of impartiality and independence is mandatory.52  Parties may 
not vary it in favor of the “traditional” U.S. approach, where impartiality was 
expected only of the third, “neutral” arbitrator – an approach that “has long 
been considered unacceptable in international arbitration.”53  To the 
contrary, the ICSID Convention requires impartiality and independence of 
all arbitrators.54  Schreuer identifies this provision as one of the Convention’s 
“mandatory rules concerning the composition of the tribunal which may not 
be departed from” and he suggests that “application by a tribunal of agreed 
rules that violate such fundamental principles could expose an award to 
annulment.”55  Likewise, reviewing courts may refuse to confirm or 
recognize non-ICSID investment awards in cases of “evident partiality.”56 
 
that agreement shall be treated . . . as an agreement to nominate an arbitrator for all purposes. Such 
nominee may only be appointed by the LCIA Court as arbitrator subject to that nominee’s compliance 
with Articles 5.3 to 5.5 [concerning impartiality and independence, and related disclosures]; and the LCIA 
Court shall refuse to appoint any nominee if it determines that the nominee is not so compliant or is 
otherwise unsuitable.”). 
 50.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, arts. 14(1), 40(2). 
 51.  Id. arts. 57–58; ICC Rules, supra note 13, arts. 14–15(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 14, arts. 
10.1–.2. 
 52.  Indeed, S.I. Strong contends that impartiality and independence of arbitrators and judges rises 
to the level of a jus cogens norm. See S.I. Strong, General Principles of Procedural Law and Procedural 
Jus Cogens, 122 PA. ST. L. REV. 347, 400–01 (2018). For more on jus cogens, see infra Part V.A. 
 53.  ROGERS, supra note 19, at 324. 
 54.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 40(2) (requiring party-appointed arbitrators not on ICSID 
Panels to have the same qualities demanded of Panel members in Article 14(1), including independent 
judgment). 
 55.  SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 10, at 679. To elaborate, Article 44 permits parties to deviate 
from the Arbitration Rules, but Schreuer explains that this permission is limited by mandatory aspects of 
the Convention and “certain international minimum standards of fair procedure . . . .” Id. ICSID has 
proposed amendments to its Arbitration Rules confirming this approach: “The Tribunal shall apply any 
agreement of the parties on procedural matters to the extent that it does not conflict with the Convention 
or the Administrative and Financial Regulations.” See ICSID Proposals, supra note 35, r. 1(2), at 32. 
 56.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV’R-STATE 
ARBITRATION § 4.18(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2019). The Restatement takes a view that 
“[a] showing of evident partiality requires proof that would cause an objective, disinterested observer 
who is fully informed of the relevant facts relating to the arbitrator’s conduct or alleged conflicts of 
interest to have a serious doubt regarding the fundamental fairness of the arbitral proceedings.” Id. § 
4.18(b). Among the factors to be considered by the reviewing court is whether the arbitrator satisfied the 
“duty to conduct a reasonable investigation into potential conflicts.” Id. § 4.18, Reporters’ note b. 
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In HEP v. Slovenia, the respondent disclosed, shortly before the merits 
hearing, that its legal team at the hearing would include a barrister from the 
same chambers as the tribunal’s president.57  The claimant objected and the 
tribunal agreed that the late revelation created an “appearance of impropriety 
and thus an unacceptable situation.”58  At the same time, “the cost and delay 
implications” of the president’s withdrawal at that stage “were apparent to 
all.”59  Withdrawal would also invite parties to engage in gamesmanship “to 
frustrate or slow down the proceedings.”60  The tribunal thus concluded that, 
in the circumstances before it, excluding the barrister from the case was 
“both necessary and appropriate” because the tribunal was “compelled . . . 
to preserve the integrity of the proceedings and, ultimately, its Award.”61  
The HEP tribunal invoked its “inherent power to take measures to preserve 
the integrity of its proceedings.”62  HEP therefore put the integrity of the 
award and “the legitimacy of the[] proceedings” ahead of a party’s 
acknowledged interest in choosing its legal team.63 
In so doing, HEP illustrates how a tribunal should prioritize the 
overarching duty to produce a valid, enforceable award based on legitimate 
proceedings.  To be sure, the tribunal acted only in response to the motion of 
a party, and it did not expressly tie its decision to ICSID’s institutional 
interests.  But its reasoning leans on institutional concerns and demonstrates 
legitimacy’s potential as an operating principle.  In other words, HEP implies 
that ICSID has an institutional interest in impartiality (and more generally in 
integrity and legitimacy) and that ICSID’s interests do and should influence 
tribunals.  After all, it is instructive to consider the alternative: ICSID would 
have borne the reputational costs if the tribunal had acknowledged the 
“unacceptable situation” but declined to remedy it.64  Institutions need 
 
 57.  Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, d.d. v. Republic of Slovn., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Tribunal’s 
Ruling, ¶ 3 (May 6, 2008), 24 ICSID Rev. 201 (2009). 
 58.  Id. ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 60.  Id. ¶ 27 (quoting Aron Broches). 
 61.  Id. ¶¶ 30, 33. 
 62.  Id. ¶ 33 (invoking ICSID Convention, art. 44 and implied powers of any international tribunal). 
 63.  Id. ¶¶ 22, 24–26. But see Rompetrol Grp. N.V. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision 
of the Tribunal on the Participation of a Counsel, ¶ 15 (Jan. 14, 2010), 24 ICSID Rev. 232 (2009) 
(declining to follow HEP on the ground that a tribunal’s inherent power should be “exercised only in 
extraordinary circumstances . . . which genuinely touch on the integrity of the arbitral process . . . .”). 
 64.  Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, d.d., 24 ICSID Rev. ¶ 21; cf. William W. Burke-White, The 
Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN 
J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 199, 224–28 (2008) (discussing the controversy over CMS 
Annulment, where the committee found the award contained manifest errors of law but held that these 
errors did not warrant annulment under the governing legal standards). 
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tribunals to act “as guardian[s] of the legitimacy of the arbitral process” and 
HEP heeded the call.65 
3. Duty of Diligence 
Arbitrators must conduct proceedings diligently, another aspect of the 
duty to perform fundamental responsibilities.  Most institutions set forth the 
requirement of arbitrator diligence in mandatory terms.  For example, the 
SCC commands, “In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall conduct the 
arbitration in an impartial, efficient and expeditious manner. . ..”66  
Meanwhile, the LCIA expressly uses the language of duty: 
[T]he Arbitral Tribunal’s general duties at all times during the arbitration 
shall include: . . . (ii) a duty to adopt procedures suitable to the 
circumstances of the arbitration, avoiding unnecessary delay and expense, 
so as to provide a fair, efficient and expeditious means for the final 
resolution of the parties’ dispute.67 
While ICSID has not previously addressed the duty of diligence, its proposed 
rules would fill that gap with a new “general duty” governing tribunals and 
parties alike.68  ICSID arbitrators would have to “use best efforts” to comply 
with time limits specified in the ICSID Rules and hold parties to deadlines.69  
They also would be required to declare: 
8  I have sufficient availability to perform my duties as arbitrator in an 
expeditious and cost-effective manner and in accordance with the time 
limits in the applicable arbitration rules. 
. . . 
9  I confirm that I will not accept new commitments that would conflict 
with or interfere with my capacity to perform my duties in this 
arbitration.70 
On a related note, arbitrators must be willing and able to participate in 
the arbitral proceedings and in preparing the award.  ICSID addresses this 
concern by enabling parties to move to disqualify an arbitrator who has 
become “incapacitated or unable to perform the duties of his [or her] 
 
 65.  Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, d.d., 24 ICSID Rev. ¶ 15. 
 66.  SCC Rules, supra note 14, art. 23(2) (emphasis added); accord PCA Rules, supra note 14, art. 
17(1) (“The arbitral tribunal . . . shall conduct the proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary delay and 
expense and to provide a fair and efficient process for resolving the parties’ dispute.”); ICC Rules, supra 
note 13, art. 22(1) (“The arbitral tribunal and the parties shall make every effort to conduct the arbitration 
in an expeditious and cost-effective manner . . . .”); see also SCC Rules, supra note 14, art. 2(1) 
(“Throughout the proceedings, the SCC, the Arbitral Tribunal and the parties shall act in an efficient and 
expeditious manner.”). 
 67.  LCIA Rules, supra note 14, art. 14.4. 
 68.  ICSID Proposals, supra note 35, r. 3(1), at 33 (“The Tribunal and the parties shall conduct the 
proceeding in good faith and in an expeditious and cost-effective manner.”). 
 69.  Id. rs. 11, 12(1), at 36. 
 70.  Id. at 242. 
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office.”71  The ICC and LCIA go further, each empowering its court to 
remove an arbitrator on its “own initiative” where an arbitrator “refuses or 
becomes unable or unfit to act,” including where an arbitrator fails to act 
with “reasonable efficiency, diligence and industry.”72 
Following the proceedings, arbitrators must render awards without 
undue delay.  ICSID, the ICC, and the SCC address this concern by setting 
deadlines for tribunals to issue awards: about six months.73  The UN 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law 
authorizes courts to terminate the appointment of an arbitrator who becomes 
“unable to perform his [or her] functions or for other reasons fails to act 
without undue delay . . . .”74 
While ICSID has demonstrated its interest in timely awards, it has not 
yet made this an institutional duty.  The 180-day rule appears in the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, not in the ICSID Convention, and parties may depart from 
the Arbitration Rules.75  By contrast, the ICC and SCC deadlines may be 
extended only with the approval of the ICC Court and SCC Board, 
restrictions that assure that the institutional interest in promptness will be 
duly considered.76  ICC parties may “shorten” time limits, but not extend 
 
 71.  ICSID Rules, supra note 35, r. 8(1); accord PCA Rules, supra note 14, art. 12(3) (“In the event 
that an arbitrator fails to act or in the event of the . . . impossibility of his or her performing his or her 
functions, the procedure in respect of the challenge of an arbitrator . . . shall apply.”). In practice “there 
has never been a disqualification” under Rule 8(1), because “[u]sually arbitrators resign on their own 
initiative if they became unable to perform the duties of office.” Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 45, at 
51. 
 72.  LCIA Rules, supra note 14, arts. 10.1–.2. The ICC Rule is similar, allowing removal when the 
Court “decides that the arbitrator is prevented . . . from fulfilling the arbitrator’s functions, or that the 
arbitrator is not fulfilling those functions in accordance with the Rules or within the prescribed time 
limits.” ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 15(2). The SCC provides for its Board of Directors to release an 
arbitrator who is “unable or fails to perform the arbitrator’s functions,” without stating expressly whether 
the Board may exercise that power on its own initiative, although self-initiation may be implied in the 
rule setting forth the functions of the Board. SCC Rules, supra note 14, art. 20(1)(iii); see id. app. I, art. 
6 (listing the “removal of arbitrators” as a function of the Board). 
 73.  Compare ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 31 (setting the time limit at six months, extendable 
only by the ICC Court, not by the tribunals themselves), with ICSID Rules, supra note 35, r. 46 (setting 
the time limit at 120 days, extendable by the tribunal up to 60 days), and SCC Rules, supra note 14, art. 
43 (“The final award shall be made no later than six months[, extendable by the SCC Board of 
Directors] . . . . upon a reasoned request from the Arbitral Tribunal or if otherwise deemed necessary.”). 
ICSID has proposed a new timetable in which most awards will be due in 240 days, but with deadlines 
of only 60 and 180 days in certain circumstances. ICSID Proposals, supra note 35, r. 58, at 61–62. 
 74.  UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 14, art. 14(1). 
 75.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 44. This distinction between the Convention and the 
Arbitration Rules is discussed further infra Part III.B. For limitations on the freedom to vary the 
Arbitration Rules, see supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 76.  ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 31(2); SCC Rules, supra note 14, art. 43. 
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them.77  The ICC is also known to use its powers over appointments and 
arbitrator compensation to enforce the duty of timeliness.78 
ICSID’s proposed amendments to its Arbitration Rules move in the 
direction of establishing an institutional duty of efficiency, particularly with 
the new language in arbitrators’ declarations and the requirement to “use best 
efforts” to meet deadlines.79  However, the best-efforts requirement focuses 
primary attention on the parties rather than the institution: “If the Tribunal 
cannot comply with an applicable time limit, it shall advise the parties of the 
special circumstances justifying the delay and the date when it anticipates 
rendering the order, decision or Award.”80  Furthermore, the amendments 
would not create a mechanism for institutional approval of delays.  Thus, 
whether the proposed amendments would establish an institutional duty of 
timely awards remains an open question.  The answer depends on whether 
ICSID would use its enforcement powers to discipline inefficiency.81 
The difference between the ICSID and ICC/SCC approaches may 
reflect the passage of time since the ICSID Convention entered into force in 
1966.  Over fifty years ago, it was probably not foreseen that delays, even 
when blessed by the parties, could affect the institution’s reputation for 
rendering timely justice.  Until recently, arbitration was commonly seen as 
fast.82  As concerns about the length and expense of arbitration have grown, 
however, institutions have responded with efforts to encourage efficiency.  
ICSID has tried within the limits of its constitutional commitment to party 
autonomy on procedural matters.  The other institutions are free of that 
 
 77.  ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 39(1). 
 78.  ROGERS, supra note 19, at 253 (“[R]epresentatives of the ICC have stated publicly that they 
have ‘punished’ delayed awards or other arbitrator dereliction with reduced fees.”); accord LCIA Rules, 
supra note 14, art. 10.7 (“[Where the LCIA Court removes an arbitrator, it] shall determine the amount 
of fees and expenses (if any) to be paid for the former arbitrator’s services, as it may consider appropriate 
in the circumstances.”); see also ROGERS, supra note 19, at 252 (“While not usually characterized as a 
form of regulation, arbitral institutions’ control over compensation for arbitrators’ fees and costs incurred 
fits within modern meanings of ‘regulation.’”). 
 79.  See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 80.  ICSID Proposals, supra note 35, r. 12(2), at 37 (emphasis added). 
 81.  ICSID rejected the suggestion made by several states that it replace the best-efforts requirement 
with a “firm obligation” to meet deadlines, on the ground that arbitrators need flexibility to address 
“special circumstances.” Id. at 291–92. In response to the suggestion that “consequences be tied to non-
compliance” with deadlines, ICSID stated: “The Centre will adopt multiple rules and practices to 
reinforce compliance [with deadlines] . . . .” Id. at 293. Such measures will include tracking compliance 
with deadlines on the ICSID website, reminding arbitrators of time limits throughout the proceeding, and 
even postponing payment of arbitrator invoices in case of delay. Id. 
 82.  See, e.g., Loukas A. Mistelis, Efficiency. What Else? Efficiency as the Emerging Defining Value 
of International Arbitration: Between Systems Theories and Party Autonomy 2 (Queen Mary Univ. of 
London, Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 313/2019, 2019), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3372341 [https://perma.cc/EN7S-SEB8] (“For many years, there was a presumption or perhaps 
a false impression that arbitration was quick and inexpensive.”). 
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constitutional constraint – and they are probably more motivated than ICSID 
to address reputational concerns about delay, because such concerns are 
acute in the more competitive marketplace for commercial arbitration.83 
B. Duty to Follow Institutional Requirements 
ICSID arbitrators must conduct arbitral proceedings “in accordance 
with the provisions of this Section [of the ICSID Convention] and, except as 
the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules.”84  This 
language expressly refers to the section of the ICSID Convention concerning 
the “powers and functions” of an arbitral tribunal.  It sets an order of priority: 
Convention provisions are mandatory, while the Arbitration Rules generally 
may yield to party autonomy.  In other words, arbitrators owe an inflexible 
duty to ICSID to comply with the Convention. 
The duty to follow the ICSID Convention governs the conduct of 
proceedings and bests the duty arbitrators owe to respect party autonomy.  
Although the text explicitly refers to only one part of the Convention, the 
duty to comply with the Convention is broader.  It would be nonsensical to 
suggest that ICSID tribunals may ignore other Convention provisions such 
as the requirement of party consent to ICSID jurisdiction, the rule that 
tribunals make decisions by majority vote, and the rules governing 
interpretation and revision of awards.  The duty to follow the Convention 
underpins all other ICSID rules; its nature is constitutional.85 
The ICC approach is similar, albeit without ICSID’s two-level 
structure.  ICC Rule 11(5) states, “By accepting to serve, arbitrators 
undertake to carry out their responsibilities in accordance with the Rules.”86  
Likewise, Rule 19 fixes compliance with the Rules above party autonomy in 
the ICC hierarchy: “The proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be 
governed by the Rules and, where the Rules are silent, by any rules which 
the parties or, failing them, the arbitral tribunal may settle on. . ..”87  The 
 
 83.  Cf. Suha Jubran Ballan, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Institutional Backgrounds: An 
Empirical Study, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 31, 88 (2016) (concluding that ICSID cases are significantly longer 
on average than SCC and UNCITRAL cases). 
 84.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 44. 
 85.  In this regard, this duty recalls Louis Henkin’s description of the role of pacta sunt servanda in 
the law of treaties as “an antecedent, underlying ‘constitutional’ principle” on which the “normative 
character” of the law depends. See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 28 
(1995); see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.”). 
 86.  ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 11(5). 
 87.  Id. art. 19 (emphasis added). 
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PCA, by contrast, allows parties to modify the procedures by agreement, 
placing party autonomy over the institutional rules.88 
Confidentiality exemplifies an institution-imposed requirement.89  
ICSID requires arbitrators to promise confidentiality.90  The SCC mandates 
that arbitrators “shall maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and the 
award.”91  These confidentiality duties are owed to both the parties and the 
institutions.  Both have interests in assuring that arbitrators uphold the 
confidentiality of proceedings intended to be confidential.  This is true even 
though the institutional interest is derivative, in that institutions suffer no 
harm when information is published with party consent.  The SCC mandate 
thus expressly exempts any publication “agreed by the parties” from the duty 
of confidentiality.92  This sense of the subsidiary nature of the institution’s 
interests may also be reflected in the ICC Rules.93 
C. Duty of Jurisdictional Policing94 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention allows ICSID tribunals to 
exercise jurisdiction over certain “legal dispute[s] arising directly out of an 
investment.”95  The Salini cases have found that this language creates an 
“investment requirement,” which obliges ICSID tribunals to discern the 
“objective” meaning of “investment” and then assess whether the claimant 
 
 88.  PCA Rules, supra note 14, art. 1(1) (“[D]isputes shall be settled in accordance with these Rules 
subject to such modification as the parties may agree.”). 
 89.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV’R-STATE 
ARBITRATION § 3.11, Reporters’ note b(iv) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2019) (quoting Filip 
De Ly et al., International Law Association International Commercial Arbitration Committee’s Report 
and Recommendations on ‘Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration,’ 28 ARB. INT’L 355, 
373 (2012)) (“[T]here seems to be a broad consensus that the duty of confidentiality is one of the primary 
duties of an arbitrator . . . .”). 
 90.  ICSID Rules, supra note 35, r. 6 (“I shall keep confidential all information coming to my 
knowledge as a result of my participation in this proceeding, as well as the contents of any award made 
by the Tribunal.”); see also id. r. 15(1) (“The deliberations of the Tribunal shall take place in private and 
remain secret.”). 
 91.  SCC Rules, supra note 14, art. 3. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  The ICC leaves to the parties’ discretion whether to request confidentiality and to the tribunal’s 
discretion how much confidentiality to order, but then compels arbitrators to honor any confidentiality 
order so rendered as an incident of the broader duty to follow ICC Rules. ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 
22(3). Where the institutional interests are sharper, in the case of proceedings of the ICC Court, the ICC 
imposes a stricter rule of confidentiality. Id. app. I, art. 6 (“The work of the Court is of a confidential 
nature which must be respected by everyone who participates in that work in whatever capacity.”). 
 94.  This section is adapted in part from Perry S. Bechky, Microinvestment Disputes, 45 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1043 (2012) [hereinafter Bechky, Microinvestment Disputes]. The argument here is 
developed more fully in Perry S. Bechky, Salini’s Nature: Arbitrators’ Duty of Jurisdictional Policing, 
17 J.L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 145 (2018) [hereinafter Bechky, Salini’s Nature]. 
 95.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 25(1). 
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made an investment that satisfied the tribunal’s definition.96  Salini thus 
suggests the existence of a duty inferred from the ICSID Convention: the 
duty to police (at least one of) the Convention’s jurisdictional limits. 
The parties cannot vary the duty of jurisdictional policing.  Salini 
declared, “it would be inaccurate to consider that the requirement that a 
dispute be ‘in direct relation to an investment’ is diluted by the consent” of 
the parties.97  Salini’s objective approach stands in opposition to the 
subjective view that a tribunal should accept the definition of “investment” 
used in the investment treaty that gave rise to the ICSID claim.  Indeed, the 
Salini cases achieve their practical force precisely because they defined 
“investment” more narrowly than traditional investment treaties. 
Salini’s proponents see an important ICSID interest at stake.98  Judge 
Shahabuddeen, for example, framed the point starkly as “a titanic struggle 
between ideas, and correspondingly between capital exporting countries and 
capital importing ones.”99  Judge Shahabuddeen argues that ICSID needs the 
Salini approach to preserve its distinct identity as an institution devoted to 
“investment disputes,” lest it become “just another” arbitral institution.100  In 
other words, proponents justify Salini with ICSID’s interest in preserving its 
legitimacy, which might be threatened by jurisdictional overreach.101 
Furthermore, ICSID can enforce the duty of jurisdictional policing.  If 
a tribunal fails to dismiss a claim “manifestly” lacking jurisdiction, the award 
 
 96.  Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 16, 2001), 6 ICSID Rep. 398 (2004). Our concern here is with Salini’s concept, 
not its details. Briefly, Salini has come to be understood as creating the following four-part “test” to define 
investment: “[i] contributions, [ii] a certain duration of performance of the contract and [iii] a participation 
in the risks of the transaction . . . [and] [iv] the contribution to the economic development of the host State 
of the investment . . . .” Bechky, Salini’s Nature, supra note 94, at 148. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  I have criticized Salini on various grounds. See Bechky, Microinvestment Disputes, supra note 
94. For present purposes, however, the views of Salini’s proponents are what matters, as they are the ones 
who have created and shaped the duty of jurisdictional policing. 
 99.  Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, ¶ 62 (Feb. 19, 2009), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ 
icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C247/DC1031_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8A6-HAL5]. 
 100.  Id. ¶ 63 (quoting Farouk Yala, The Notion of ‘Investment’ in ICSID Case Law: A Drifting 
Jurisdictional Requirement?, 22 J. INT’L ARB. 105, 125 (2005)). 
 101.  In particular, Judge Shahabuddeen made an impassioned case for adhering to Salini’s fourth 
prong: requiring a contribution to development of the host state as a jurisdictional condition. Id. ¶ 29. In 
his view, this requirement is what “separate[s] an ICSID investment from any other kind of investment” 
and “ICSID arbitration . . . from any other kind of arbitration . . . .” Id. ¶ 30. He concludes, “there could 
only be an ICSID investment if the investment was intended to promote the economic development of 
the host state . . . .” Id. ¶ 65. On this view, the threat to legitimacy comes not only from mission creep in 
abstracto, but particularly from abandoning ICSID’s “original mission” of promoting development. Id. ¶ 
22. But see Bechky, Microinvestment Disputes, supra note 94, at 1064–72, 1084–93 (arguing that Salini 
and especially its fourth prong harm the cause of development). 
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may be annulled.102  ICSID may discipline breaches of this duty, like the 
others discussed above, through its control over appointments.103  And there 
has even been one case where the absence of an investment was so plain that 
the ICSID Secretariat simply refused to register the claim.104 
In recent years, influenced by Salini and its progeny, investment treaties 
narrowed the definition of “investment” by incorporating some (but almost 
never all) of the objective criteria listed in the cases.105  Cases under these 
new treaties should eventually close the gap between the subjective and 
objective approaches, as the Parties themselves have adopted objective 
elements.  These new treaties show that, details aside, recent state practice 
has ratified the duty of tribunals to police jurisdictional limits. 
IV. DUTIES TO NON-PARTY PARTICIPANTS 
Traditionally, when one state injured a citizen of another, the latter 
could make a state-to-state claim.  The states controlled the process: they 
might, for example, settle the matter or submit it to some form of 
adjudication.106  The modern era of investment treaties has sought to 
“depoliticize” investment disputes by substituting the injured investor as 
claimant in place of its home state.107  Notwithstanding this fundamental 
change, it should be understood that the home state has interests in the 
 
 102.  ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 52(1)(b) (allowing annulment if “the Tribunal has 
manifestly exceeded its powers . . . .”). 
 103.  See ROGERS, supra note 19. 
 104.  ICSID must register arbitral claims, unless it finds that the claim is “manifestly outside the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.” ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 36(3). ICSID officials have disclosed 
several instances where ICSID refused to register a claim, including a claim based on a “simple sale.” 
Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
¶ 52 (July 16, 2001), 6 ICSID Rep. 398 (2004) (citing Ibrahim F.I. Shihata & Antonio R. Parra, The 
Experience of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 FOREIGN INV. L.J. 299, 
308 (1999)). 
 105.  See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1 [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT], 
available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/V6VV-8V38] (“‘[I]nvestment’ means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment 
of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 106.  See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 
3, ¶ 79 (Feb. 5) (“The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be 
granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. . . . [T]he State enjoys complete freedom of 
action.”). 
 107.  See, e.g., Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The 
Roles of ICSID and MIGA, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 313 
(Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. Parra eds., 1991). 
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dispute.  The home state, after all, is a Party to the investment treaty, with its 
own reasons for entering the treaty and its own obligations thereunder.108 
Other international legal regimes have long recognized that other 
Parties to a treaty may have interests in a dispute construing that treaty.  For 
example, the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”) has a formal procedure 
for “third party” participation by other Members.109  Third-party Members 
receive some written submissions and they have the right to make oral and 
written submissions to the panel and Appellate Body.110  Their submissions 
must be “reflected in the panel report.”111  Panels must “fully take[] into 
account” the interests of both “the parties to a dispute and those of other 
Members,”112 and a study has concluded that they do so in practice.113 
Investment arbitration had been somewhat slow to acknowledge the 
interests of the investor’s home state and other non-disputing states, perhaps 
influenced by depoliticization and the arbitral traditions of confidentiality 
and party control.  A marked shift in governing norms is underway, however, 
leaving little doubt that non-disputing state-Parties to an investment treaty 
now have the right to participate in arbitrations thereunder.  And, where these 
states have rights, arbitrators owe corresponding duties. 
NAFTA, a leader in opening tribunals to participation by non-disputing 
state-Parties, provided, “On written notice to the disputing parties, a Party 
may make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation of this 
Agreement.”114  Much more recently, the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Investment Treaty Arbitration state, “The arbitral tribunal 
shall . . . allow . . . submissions on issues of treaty interpretation from a non-
 
 108.  To minimize confusion between parties to a dispute and Parties to a treaty, this article 
capitalizes the latter usage. 
 109.  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 10, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 
[hereinafter WTO DSU]. 
 110.  Id. arts. 10.2–.3, 17.4. 
 111.  Id. art. 10.2. 
 112.  Id. art. 10.1. 
 113.  Sivan Shlomo Agon & Eyal Benvenisti, The Law of Strangers: The Form and Substance of 
Other-Regarding International Adjudication, 68 U. TORONTO L.J. 598, 628 (2018) (“[B]oth the AB and 
panels have continually displayed a sympathetic other-regarding stance toward non-litigating members 
assuming a third party role in WTO disputes, taking their views into account in a manner shown to 
substantively affect the content of . . . rulings.”). 
 114.  NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1128; accord United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, art. 
14.D.7.2, Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-
canada-agreement/agreement-between [https://perma.cc/WP6V-7TZV] (“The non-disputing Annex 
Party may make oral and written submissions to the tribunal regarding the interpretation of this 
Agreement.”). 
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disputing Party to the treaty.”115  This duty to “allow submissions” will 
extend to more cases as more states accept the Mauritius Convention 
concerning transparency in investment arbitration.116  The SCC adopted this 
approach in 2017, and ICSID has proposed to do the same.117 
The duty to allow submissions should be construed generously.  It must 
go beyond mere acceptance of a submission, to reading and respectfully 
considering it.  Like WTO panelists, investment arbitrators should “fully 
take[] into account” the interests of other Parties to the treaty.118  Given that 
ICSID tribunals routinely construe the ICSID Convention, thereby 
implicating the interests of all ICSID Members, the duty to allow 
submissions might expand to submissions from all Member States. 
On the other hand, this duty must also be properly circumscribed to 
respect other interests.  Submissions by non-disputing Parties cannot be 
disruptive, unduly burdensome, or unfairly prejudicial.119  Such submissions 
cannot be tantamount to diplomatic protection, which is inconsistent with the 
nature of investor-state arbitration.120  The tribunal must not draw inferences 
if a home state stays silent, which again is inconsistent with the depoliticized 
nature of the system.121  Finally, the parties must have fair opportunity to 
comment on any submissions. 
Arbitrators do not owe the same duty to other amici.  Participation by 
amici other than treaty Parties is a matter of tribunal discretion, not duty, and 
 
 115.  U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based 
Investor-State Arbitration, art. 5(1) (Jan. 2014) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency], 
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/rules-on-transparency-
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SGG-KURK] (applying to cases conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules). 
 116.  United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, 
Annex, art. 2.1, Dec. 10, 2014, adopted by G.A. Res. 69/116 (Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter the Mauritius 
Convention] (applying the Transparency Rules to cases involving a respondent state that is party to the 
Mauritius Convention, whether or not the cases are governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). The 
Mauritius Convention entered into force on October 18, 2017, albeit with only seven ratifications as of 
March 26, 2021. Status: United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Arbitration (New York, 2014), UNCITRAL, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/ 
transparency/status [https://perma.cc/9XA9-GLE3] (last visited Mar. 26, 2021). 
 117.  SCC Rules, supra note 14, app. III, art. 4; ICSID Proposals, supra note 35, r. 68, at 68. 
 118.  WTO DSU, supra note 109, art. 10.1. 
 119.  See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 115, art. 5(4). 
 120.  See SCC Rules, supra note 14, app. III, art. 4(2)(ii) (“[T]he Arbitral Tribunal shall . . . 
[consider] the need to avoid submissions appearing to support the investor’s claim in a manner tantamount 
to diplomatic protection . . . .”). 
 121.  See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 115, art. 5(3) (disallowing inferences from 
absence of a submission); ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 27 (prohibiting diplomatic protection in 
ICSID disputes). 
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that discretion is cabined by the tribunal’s other duties.122  Even so, 
arbitrators must owe some limited implicit duties to other amici.  As the rules 
governing amicus participation usually specify criteria for tribunals to 
consider when determining whether to allow an amicus submission,123 
arbitrators implicitly owe applicants the obligation to assess their 
applications in good faith.  Likewise, where an amicus submission is 
accepted, arbitrators should read and respectfully consider it in good faith.124 
V. SYSTEMIC DUTIES 
A systemic duty is a duty inherent in the investor-state arbitrators’ 
function, a duty that respects the nature and the integrity of the dispute 
settlement system.  Systemic duties may therefore be described as 
“responsibilities to the process,” to borrow a phrase from the NAFTA Code 
of Conduct,125 which has also been adopted by ICSID and UNCITRAL.126  
They may arise from applicable treaties, international law, and arbitral rules.  
 
 122.  See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 115, art. 4; ICSID Rules, supra note 35, r. 
37(2); SCC Rules, supra note 14, app. III, arts. 3(8)–(10); NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n [NAFTA FTC], 
Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation, pt. B, reprinted in 44 
I.L.M. 796 (May 2005) [hereinafter Statement of NAFTA FTC]. 
 123.  See, e.g., UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 115, art. 4(3) (“[T]he arbitral tribunal 
shall take into consideration, among other factors it determines to be relevant: (a) [w]hether the third 
person has a significant interest in the arbitral proceedings; and (b) [t]he extent to which the submission 
would assist the arbitral tribunal . . . .”). 
 124.  The NAFTA Free Trade Commission specified, “The granting of leave to file a non-disputing 
party submission does not require the Tribunal to address that submission at any point in the arbitration.” 
Statement of NAFTA FTC, supra note 122, pt. B(9). While it would go too far to contend that arbitrators 
have a duty to address amicus submissions, I suggest they must consider the submissions lest they render 
the whole amicus process a charade. Moreover, it is preferable for arbitrators to address amicus 
submissions, as this is the only way to assure the public that the submissions were considered. Cf. Fuller, 
supra note 20 (“Without [reasoned] opinions the parties have to take it on faith that . . . the arbiter has in 
fact understood and taken into account their proofs and arguments.”); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID, 
Award, ¶ 8, 48 I.L.M. 1038 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009) (“[I]t is the Tribunal’s view that it 
should address those [amicus] filings explicitly in its Award to the degree they bear on decisions that 
must be taken.”). 
 125.  Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement Procedures Under Chapters 19 & 20 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 59 Fed. Reg. 8720, pt. I (Feb. 23, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA Code of 
Conduct]. Because the NAFTA Parties “place prime importance on the integrity and impartiality” of 
proceedings to resolve trade disputes, they published the Code of Conduct setting forth the adjudicators’ 
“responsibilities to the process,” namely, that they “shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety and shall observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and impartiality of the 
dispute settlement process is preserved.” Id. pmbl., pt. I. The Code applies to adjudicators in trade disputes 
under NAFTA Chapters 19 and 20—not to arbitrators in investment disputes under Chapter 11—but in 
my judgment, at least, there is no distinction among the dispute settlement provisions that would support 
a lesser regard for responsibilities to the process by investment arbitrators than trade adjudicators. Id. 
pmbl. 
 126.  Draft Code, supra note 43, art. 3, para. 25 (“The enumerated duties are owed to the parties, to 
the process and to the other adjudicators.”) (emphasis added). 
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Arbitrators owe these duties, not to the parties or arbitral institutions, but to 
the creators of the investment arbitration system (states) and its ultimate 
beneficiaries (the global public).127 
The Glamis Gold tribunal recognized the concept of a systemic duty, 
reasoning that each NAFTA tribunal must act with “sensitivity to the 
position of future tribunals and an awareness of other systemic 
implications.”128  The tribunal described NAFTA Chapter 11 as establishing 
“a significant public system of private investment protection,” the “ultimate 
integrity” of which depends on each tribunal acting with “a modicum of 
awareness of each of these tribunals for each other and the system as a 
whole.”129 
The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules and, by extension, the Mauritius 
Convention on transparency in investment arbitration provide examples of 
systemic duties.  They create certain limited duties that arbitrators owe to 
“any person.”  They divide arbitral documents into three categories: 
(1) arbitrators must “ma[ke] available to the public” many documents, 
including pleadings, memorials, transcripts, and the tribunal’s 
decisions; 
(2) arbitrators must release “expert reports and witness statements, 
exclusive of the exhibits thereto” on request by “any person”; and 
(3) arbitrators may release in their discretion the exhibits (and any other 
documents not covered by the first two categories), on their own 
initiative or on request by “any person,” after consultation with the 
parties.130 
The Transparency Rules thus expressly oblige arbitrators to release certain 
documents to “any person” and also implicitly require them to consider in 
good faith a request by “any person” for other documents.131  In these limited 
respects, therefore, arbitrators have a duty to the public. 
This idea of a duty to the public can also be seen in the requirement that 
arbitrators make many basic documents “available to the public” without 
waiting for any request.132  This requirement acknowledges the public 
interest in transparency of investor-state arbitration and it serves that interest 
by placing a corresponding obligation upon arbitrators.  Parties cannot waive 
or vary this duty owed to the public.  Instead, unlike commercial arbitration, 
 
 127.  Cf. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 331, 347 (2009) (arguing that a state’s claim to sovereignty depends on fulfilling its obligations as a 
fiduciary of the people). 
 128.  Glamis Gold, Ltd., 48 I.L.M. 1038, ¶ 6. 
 129.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 130.  UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 115, art. 3. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
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transparency has emerged as a systemic element of investment arbitration.  
Consequently, investment arbitrators have systemic obligations to assure that 
transparency. 
The fact that systemic duties are due to the public, not to a readily 
identifiable individual, does not render them unenforceable.  Arbitral 
institutions may enforce systemic duties, just as they enforce institutional 
duties.133  States, appointing authorities, and reviewing courts also have 
enforcement capabilities.  And an arbitrator who breaches a systemic duty 
may suffer reputational discipline. 
The remainder of this section discusses several systemic duties binding 
on investment arbitrators: (a) the duty to comply with jus cogens norms; (b) 
the duty to respect the United Nations Charter; and (c) certain institutional 
duties that also have systemic consequences. 
A. Duty to Comply with Jus Cogens Norms 
Investor-state arbitrators have a systemic duty to comply with jus 
cogens norms.  A jus cogens norm is peremptory, “a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted . . . .”134  A treaty is void if it violates 
a jus cogens norm.135  It follows that investor-state arbitrators must not order 
any state to transgress, or penalize a state for taking actions necessary to 
comply with, a jus cogens norm.136  As stated by the tribunal in Methanex, 
“[A]s a matter of international constitutional law a tribunal has an 
independent duty to apply imperative principles of law or jus cogens and not 
to give effect to parties’ choices of law that are inconsistent with such 
 
 133.  The Draft Code mainly keeps its powder dry on the question of how the Code might be enforced 
beyond self-compliance by adjudicators and the existing disqualification and removal procedures. See 
Draft Code, supra note 43, art. 12. It rightly notes that attention should be paid to how enforcement is 
implemented, especially as there may be reputational or financial consequences for adjudicators alleged 
to have breached the Code. Id. art. 12, paras. 92–94. It also recognizes that enforcement options will vary 
depending on how ISDS evolves, e.g., whether a new court or other standing mechanism is created. Id. 
art. 12.3, paras. 88, 95–96. As it appears that institutions will have a role in any enforcement mechanism, 
the final version of the code should expressly state that arbitrators owe their duties to institutions (among 
the others already listed). 
 134.  Vienna Convention, supra note 85, art. 53. 
 135.  Id. arts. 53, 64. 
 136.  See, e.g., Susan L. Karamanian, The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L.R. 423, 436 (2013) (“[J]us cogens norms should trump obligations under an 
[investment treaty] . . . .”); Moshe Hirsch, Interactions Between Investment and Non-Investment 
Obligations in International Investment Law 7 (Int’l Law Forum of the Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem 
Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 14-06, 2006) (“Since some fundamental human rights are protected 
by peremptory rules of international law . . . recognizing the superior status of these rules may require 
future investment tribunals to subject some provisions included in investment treaties to these higher 
principles of public international law . . . .”). 
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principles.”137 This is a crucial systemic point to establish: investor-state 
arbitrators must respect the hierarchy of norms established in international 
law, because they act under international law138 and their work is inextricably 
bound with the international legal system.139 
The duty to comply with jus cogens norms retains its systemic 
significance, even if one might wonder how often investment arbitration 
impinges on such norms.  As Georges Abi-Saab has said, even if the concept 
of jus cogens were an “empty box, the category [is] still useful; for without 
the box, it cannot be filled.”140 
Determining how to fill the jus cogens box is notably challenging.  The 
International Court of Justice has had little to say about the box’s contents.141  
The Court has described the prohibition of genocide as “assuredly” 
peremptory,142 but has otherwise spoken inconclusively.143  Even the 
International Law Commission decided, in its ongoing project on jus cogens, 
 
 137.  Methanex Corp. v. U.S., Final Award, pt. IV, ch. C, ¶ 24 (Aug. 3, 2005) 16 ICSID Rep. 32 
(2005) (rejecting the contention that the United States had violated a jus cogens norm against non-
discrimination, while accepting that some actions inhibiting claims against discrimination could rise to 
the level of jus cogens violations). 
 138.  At least in the context of tribunals in investment treaty cases and other ICSID tribunals, perhaps 
leaving some room to quibble about investor-state arbitration in cases outside ICSID arising from 
contracts or domestic law. 
 139.  In this regard, Pauwelyn notes: 
[S]tates, in their treaty relations, can contract out of . . . rules of general international law (other 
than those of jus cogens), but they cannot contract out of the system of international law. As 
soon as States contract with one another, they do so automatically and necessarily within the 
system of international law. 
Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 535, 539 (2001). An ICSID award deemed it “evident” that Pauwelyn’s logic “holds true in 
international investment law” as well. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 
¶ 78 (Apr. 15, 2009), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C74/DC1033_ 
En.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L3K-HNGS]. 
 140.  Strong, supra note 52, at 391, 391 n.242 (quoting Georges Abi-Saab, The Third World and the 
Future of the International Legal Order, 29 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INT’L 27, 53 (1973)) (Egypt) 
(internal punctuation omitted). 
 141.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 85, art. 53. 
 142.  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 
I.C.J. 6, ¶ 64 (July 6). 
 143.  For example, in Nicaragua v. United States, the Court noted that the International Law 
Commission and the state parties considered the prohibition on use of armed force to be jus cogens, 
without announcing its own conclusion. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 190 (June 27). Likewise, in Germany v. Italy, the Court 
assumed without deciding “that the rules of the law of armed conflict which prohibit the murder of 
civilians in occupied territory, the deportation of civilian inhabitants to slave labour and the deportation 
of prisoners of war to slave labour are rules of jus cogens . . . .” Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 100, ¶ 93 (Feb. 3). 
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not to “provide an illustrative list of existing norms of jus cogens.”144  This 
uncertainty may well put investment arbitrators in the difficult – frankly 
unsettling – position of having to decide whether certain norms rise to the 
jus cogens level with little guidance from the Court or Commission.  
Although this duty is heavy, it must not be shirked in an appropriate case.  
The alternative would risk grave harm to the public interest by, for example, 
finding a state in breach of a treaty that is void precisely because it conflicts 
with the highest values of the international community. 
The impact of peremptory norms on investment arbitration (and vice 
versa) depends on how the jus cogens box is filled.  We may hope and expect 
that few claims will ever be brought concerning “investments made in 
violation of the most fundamental rules of protection of human rights, like 
investments made in pursuance of torture or genocide or in support of slavery 
or trafficking of human organs.”145  But broader conceptions of jus cogens 
could overlap more frequently, and more profoundly, with investment 
arbitration.  For example, Professor Sornarajah has argued that “permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources” is a jus cogens norm that prioritizes the 
public interest over contracts concerning natural resources by “justif[ying] 
variations of these contractual rights when the public interest requires such 
a change.”146  Perhaps even more broadly, Sornarajah has contended that 
investment treaty protection should be cast aside during times of “economic 
and political crisis.”147  He posits that the investment treaty’s “lesser . . . 
obligations” should yield to the state’s “duty to restore order,” which serves 
the right to life and “some social and economic rights [that] are also ius 
cogens rights.”148 
Beyond the challenge of determining which norms qualify as jus 
cogens, investment arbitrators may also face other difficult questions about 
 
 144.  See Sean D. Murphy, Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens) and Other 
Topics: The Seventy-First Session of the International Law Commission, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 68, 71–72 
(2020). Concerned that the task of “determining whether a particular norm is jus cogens is . . . very 
complex and, at times, controversial,” the Commission instead published “a list of some of the norms that 
have been ‘referred to’ in prior work . . . without assessing whether those norms . . . are jus cogens . . . .” 
Id. The Commission’s list has only eight norms, concerning aggression, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, international humanitarian law, racial discrimination, slavery, torture, and self-determination. 
Id. at 71. For an example of a much longer list of candidates, see THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL CONTRACT 200–65 (2015). 
 145.  Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 78 (Apr. 15, 2009), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C74/DC1033_En.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/58A2-HXWT] (deeming such investments beyond the pale of ICSID jurisdiction). 
 146.  El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Legal Opinion of M. Sornarajah, 
¶ 28 (Mar. 5, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0970.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XC8P-KERA]; see also id. ¶¶ 125–26. 
 147.  Id. ¶¶ 123–24. 
 148.  Id. 
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the impact of peremptory norms on actual cases.  For example, can jus 
cogens be raised as a sword or only as a shield?149  How closely must the 
government actions at issue relate to the jus cogens norms they claim to 
serve, does it matter whether the state could have pursued an alternative 
policy less harmful to the investor, and how much leeway do governments 
have in choosing whether, when, and how to act?150 
B. Duty to Respect the United Nations Charter 
Article 103 of the UN Charter provides, “In the event of a conflict 
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”151  
Article 103 raises issues akin to jus cogens by elevating certain legal 
obligations above investment treaties.  Investment arbitrators act as part of 
the international legal system and thus owe the systemic duty to give priority 
to states’ Charter obligations over investment treaties in case of a conflict. 
Such conflicts might arise from economic sanctions imposed by the UN 
Security Council to “maintain or restore international peace and security.”152 
The Security Council has the power to decide what measures to take, 
including “complete or partial interruption of economic relations,” and to 
“call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.”153 
“[A]ll the Members of the United Nations” must take “the action required to 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council.”154 
For example, in September 2017 in response to North Korea’s nuclear 
program, the Security Council decided that “States shall prohibit, by their 
nationals or in their territories, the opening, maintenance, and operation of 
all joint ventures or cooperative entities, new and existing, with [North 
 
 149.  See Karamanian, supra note 136, at 435–38 (favoring defensive, over offensive, invocations of 
jus cogens). 
 150.  These difficulties recall past controversies in international investment law about the meaning 
of the word “necessary” and margins of appreciation. Compare William W. Burke-White & Andreas von 
Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-
Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 409 (2008) 
(arguing for more deference to states in the interpretation of clauses that allow measures “necessary” for 
certain public interests, based on the European margin of appreciation doctrine and the least restrictive 
alternative approach in WTO cases), with José E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity 
Defense: Continental Casualty v. Argentina, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
POLICY 2010–2011 319, 352 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012) (arguing for an approach to such clauses based 
on the narrower definition of “necessity” used in customary international law). 
 151.  U.N. Charter art. 103. 
 152.  Id. art. 39. 
 153.  Id. art. 41. 
 154.  Id. art. 48, ¶ 1. 
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Korean] entities or individuals.”155  The potential impact on investors is 
plain.  If a North Korean investor, hurt by Chinese sanctions taken pursuant 
to the Security Council Resolution, were to bring an arbitral claim under the 
China-North Korea investment treaty, China should have a valid defense 
under Article 103.156  Some investment treaties take the precaution of 
expressly listing compliance with Security Council Resolutions as a 
defense,157 but such language is not strictly necessary in light of Article 103. 
The pool of potential claimants is not restricted to North Korean 
investors.  For example, if the joint venture in China shuttered by sanctions 
had a Swiss joint venture partner, the Swiss partner would also have a claim 
regarding the Chinese actions against the joint venture but for Article 103.158  
Likewise for a German investor in China159 whose business depended on 
importing North Korean lead, but was crippled by another aspect of the UN 
sanctions.160 
C. Institutional Duties Revisited 
As discussed, investor-state arbitrators owe duties to arbitral 
institutions, including the duty to judge fairly, the duty of independence and 
impartiality, the duty of diligence, the duty to give reasons, the duty to follow 
institutional requirements, and the duty of jurisdictional policing.161  Having 
 
 155.  S.C. Res. 2375, ¶ 18 (Sept. 11, 2017). The Security Council excepted, significantly, “existing 
China-DPRK hydroelectric power infrastructure projects and the Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and 
rail project” as well as projects approved in advance by a UN Committee, “in particular . . . non-
commercial, public utility infrastructure projects not generating profit . . . .” Id. 
 156.  Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-N. Kor., art. 9(3), Mar. 22, 
2005, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/750/down 
load [https://perma.cc/N2GP-KNEN] (last visited Mar. 28, 2021) (allowing ad hoc arbitration). Even 
isolated, communist North Korea has fifteen investment treaties in force. IIAs By Economy: Korea, Dem. 
People’s Rep. of: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy. 
unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/110/korea-democratic-people-s-republic-of 
[https://perma.cc/7U62-N4QX ] (last visited Mar. 28, 2021) (listing the bilateral investment treaties 
between North Korea and various countries). 
 157.  See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation, and Protection of Investment, China-
Japan-S. Kor., art. 18(1)(b), May 13, 2012, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaty-files/2633/download [https://perma.cc/PZK2-7H6V]. More commonly, treaty 
defenses refer to “maintenance or restoration of international peace and security,” tracking the Charter’s 
language without naming it. See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 105, art. 18(2). 
 158.  Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Switz., art. 11, 
Jan. 27, 2009, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/ 
4811/download [https://perma.cc/AZ68-C3N7]. 
 159.  Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Ger., art. 
9, Dec. 1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253. 
 160.  S.C. Res. 2371, ¶ 10 (Aug. 5, 2017). 
 161.  See supra Parts II–III. 
PB. ARBITRATORS FINAL V2 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021  9:01 PM 
250 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:221 
explained why these duties are owed to the institutions, I now reconsider the 
same duties from a systemic perspective. 
Picture an ICSID arbitration.  Now, remove ICSID from the image.  
Should the arbitrators hearing the same case ad hoc behave differently 
because the case is outside ICSID?  In some respects, the answer is yes: the 
Convention does not apply, the arbitral rules differ.  But the arbitrators’ 
fundamental responsibilities as arbitrators remain the same.  The arbitrators 
must remain impartial and independent.  They must conduct fair 
proceedings.  They must produce timely, written, valid, enforceable, and 
usually reasoned awards.162 
Removing the institution from the picture highlights that many 
institutional duties are also systemic.  They are inherent in the investment 
arbitration system.163  They are necessary to the basic legitimacy of the 
system.  They serve the public interest.  Like other systemic duties, they may 
be enforced by appointing authorities and reviewing courts, as well as by 
parties and institutions. 
The way Salini’s duty of jurisdictional policing slipped loose the 
bounds of ICSID illustrates this relationship between institutional and 
systemic duties.  Given that Salini construes a provision of the ICSID 
Convention, one might have expected its duty to remain within ICSID’s 
confines.  As discussed above, however, recent investment treaties tend to 
incorporate aspects of Salini’s test into their definitions – a trend that should 
oblige non-ICSID tribunals to similarly police jurisdictional limits.  Indeed, 
Salini’s movement beyond ICSID has already begun.  At least two tribunals 
acting outside the ICSID Convention have applied Salini’s duty, both 
considering that this duty should apply equally regardless of the arbitral 
forum because they deemed it inherent in the concept of investment 
arbitration.164  What began as an institutional duty—based on particular 
 
 162.  One might contend that these duties are not truly systemic, because the arbitrators are merely 
following the applicable arbitral rules. This contention is valid to some extent, but it misses the larger 
point that all the arbitral rules mandate compliance with this same set of responsibilities precisely because 
they are so central to the investment arbitrators’ function. It is almost inconceivable that one of the major 
international institutions would permit arbitrators to deviate from such basic norms. Were an institution 
to do so, states should object and refuse to consent to arbitration there. Admittedly, renegotiating 
investment treaties to remove previously-agreed consent clauses is challenging, which would be more 
concerning were this scenario less far-fetched. 
 163.  In this regard, ICSID and UNCITRAL have jointly proposed a draft code of conduct to apply 
to all investor-state disputes. See Draft Code, supra note 43. The trans-institutional nature of the proposal 
supports the view that the adjudicators’ responsibilities are systemic in nature. Unsurprisingly, the Draft 
Code incorporates all of the fundamental responsibilities discussed in this article, including fairness, 
diligence, and independence and impartiality. Id. arts. 3–4, 7.1, 8.1. 
 164.  Romak S.A. v. Uzb., PCA Case Repository No. AA280, Award, ¶¶ 207–08 (Nov. 26, 2009), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/491 [https://perma.cc/6ABJ-H3NJ]; Nova Scotia Power Inc. v. 
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language in the ICSID Convention and particular institutional 
considerations—came to be seen by states and tribunals as a duty that should 
be applied, with some changes, system-wide. 
Glamis Gold expressly used systemic duties to inform its approach to 
the duty to give reasons.165  The tribunal considered it “important that a 
NAFTA tribunal provide particularly detailed reasons for its decisions,” to 
foster “governmental and public faith in the integrity of the process of 
arbitration” and long-term support for the NAFTA system.166  Glamis Gold 
also considered that the nature of the NAFTA arbitration system required it 
to include in its award both an executive summary that “communicate[s] its 
conclusions succinctly to the various branches of government or public” and 
 
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/1, Award, ¶¶ 75, 78, 80–81, 84 (Apr. 30, 2014), http://icsidfiles. 
worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1380/DC4774_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UF9-SA 
F8]. Note that cases heard by the ICSID Additional Facility are not governed by the ICSID Convention. 
For an introduction to the Additional Facility, see SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 10, at 141–43, 1120–23. 
 165.  Glamis Gold was governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which require written 
awards, normally with reasons unless the parties agree otherwise. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID, 
Award, ¶ 8, 48 I.L.M. 1038 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009); see UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
supra note 27, arts. 34(2)–(3). We have seen above the private benefits of reasoned awards, but such 
awards also serve the public interest, at least when published. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
The ICSID Convention prioritizes party autonomy over the public interest with regard to publication, 
specifying that awards may only be published with party consent. ICSID Convention, supra 6, art. 48(5). 
In practice, however, many ICSID awards have become public and ICSID has gone so far as to commit 
to publish “excerpts of legal reasoning” even without party consent. ICSID Rules, supra note 35, r. 48(4); 
see also Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], ICSID Administrative and Financial 
Regulations, ch. IV, Reg. 22(2) (Apr. 10, 2006) (“The Secretary-General shall . . . . arrange for . . . 
publication . . . with a view to furthering the development of international law in relation to 
investments.”). Publication has helped to build the law, described variously as “[a] consolidating 
jurisprudence, an international common law of investor rights, an investment jurisprudence, or a common 
legal opinion or jurisprudence constante” and even “ICSID’s case law.” Jeffery P. Commission, 
Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129, 135, 144 (2007) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence 
Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 265, 274 
(Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that investor-state precedents will produce a jurisprudence 
constante, akin to civil law societies, capable of producing “significant advantages with respect to 
predictability and legitimacy . . . .”). 
 166.  Glamis Gold, Ltd., 48 I.L.M. 1038, ¶ 8; accord Federico Ortino, Transparency of Investment 
Awards: External and Internal Dimensions, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 119, 138–40 (Junji Nakagawa ed., 2013) (calling for arbitrators to 
provide “a high level of clarity in their reasoning” given the nature of “investment treaty disputes [as] 
essentially a form of public law adjudication.”); Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State 
Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global 
Administrative Law 45 (N.Y. UNIV. Sch. of Law Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, IILJ Working Paper No. 
2009/6, 2009) (arguing that the reasoning of awards should speak to the “interests and engagements of 
non-represented and non-participating stakeholders” and, where appropriate, “should engage with these 
wider and systemic issues”). 
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an explanation of any departure from “major trends present in previous 
decisions.”167 
Traco v. Poland offers a third example of a dual institutional-systemic 
duty.  The case arose from the investment treaty between Germany and 
Poland, which specified that each party “shall bear the cost of its own 
member” on the tribunal, unless the “tribunal may make a different 
regulation concerning costs.”168  The ad hoc tribunal decided to require the 
parties to share the fees of all three arbitrators, finding the notion that each 
party has “its own member” is: 
based on a misconception of arbitral justice that the Tribunal considers 
manifestly incompatible with contemporary conceptions of the 
independence and impartiality of international arbitrators. . ..  [T]he same 
standard of impartiality and independence is required for all members of 
an arbitration tribunal; and an arbitrator cannot be considered, by virtue of 
his or her appointment by one disputing party, to be that party’s ‘own’ 
arbitrator.  In this case, all three arbitrators were and remain required to be 
arbitrators for both Parties, with the two party-appointed arbitrators under 
exactly the same duties of independence and impartiality as the 
chairman.169 
The Traco tribunal thus recognized a systemic interest in arbitrators’ 
independence and impartiality and invoked that interest to guide its 
discretion in allocating costs.170 
 
 167.  Glamis Gold, Ltd., 48 I.L.M. 1038, ¶ 8. 
 168.  Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Pol., art. 
10(5), Nov. 10, 1989, 1708 U.N.T.S. 324 (emphasis added). 
 169.  Luke Eric Peterson, Citing Need for Independence and Impartiality of All Arbitrators, Tribunal 
Frowns on BIT’s Provision that Each Party Should Fund Its Own Arbitrator; Similar BIT Wording Led 
to Unpublicized Reversal of Costs Ruling in Eureko v. Poland Case, INV. ARB. REP. (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/citing-need-for-independence-and-impartiality-of-all-arbitrators-
tribunal-frowns-on-bits-provision-that-each-party-should-fund-its-own-arbitrator-similar-bit-wording-
led-to-unpublicized-reversal-o/ [https://perma.cc/M7NN-Y42X] (quoting TRACO Deutsche Travertin 
Werke GmbH v. Pol., Final Award on Costs (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013) (not published)). 
 170.  Investment Arbitration Reporter also reports on two similar cases that seem to show a limit to 
the Traco approach. Id. These cases arose under the Netherlands-Poland investment treaty, which 
similarly provides for each party to bear the costs of the “arbitrator appointed by itself” without any 
language empowering the tribunal to divide costs differently. Id. Enkev v. Poland decided that the treaty 
language “circumscribed” the tribunal’s powers to allocate costs, while Eureko v. Poland apparently went 
so far as to reverse a cost decision that had failed to comply with the treaty rule on costs. Id.; Enkev 
Beheer B.V. v. Pol., PCA Case No. 2013-01, Final Award on Costs, ¶ 57 (June 13, 2014), https:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw6209.pdf [https://perma.cc/73J4-EH9G]. In 
other words, in these cases, the systemic interest in preserving arbitrators’ independence and impartiality 
from erosion by outdated notions of arbitrator compensation yielded to the tribunal’s duty to follow the 
applicable law. 
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By contrast, arbitrators’ duty of confidentiality is mainly institutional, 
without a systemic counterpart.171  Institutions impose varying duties of 
confidentiality – or none.  There is generally no public interest in insisting 
on stricter confidentiality than the institutions themselves require.  In fact, 
the public interest normally runs the other way: an interest in securing access 
to information of public concern.172  This is the public interest captured in 
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, the Mauritius Convention, and the 
ICSID Rules.173  Arguably, however, there is a systemic duty to maintain 
confidentiality of two types of information: arbitrators’ private 
deliberations174 and particularly sensitive information (such as trade secrets 
and classified information) that must be disclosed to an investor-state 
tribunal.  Such sensitive information is properly excepted from public 
disclosure.175  This exception serves the basic legitimacy of the investment 
arbitration system as any adjudicator must allow parties to present their 
cases,176 a necessity that should not be inhibited by threat of public revelation 
of this core minimum of sensitive information. 
VI. WHY DUTIES TO NON-PARTIES MATTER 
Benedict Kingsbury and his co-authors define “global administrative 
law” as: 
comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social 
understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of 
global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate 
 
 171.  See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF 
INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV’R-STATE ARBITRATION § 3.11, Reporters’ note b(iv) (AM. LAW INST., 
Proposed Final Draft 2019). 
 172.  Cf. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
427, 462 (2010) (“[C]onfidentiality . . . would seem to weaken the role of investor-state arbitration as a 
mechanism for regime decisionmaking. Regime decisions need to be widely and publicly diffused for the 
regime to operate effectively.”). 
 173.  See supra Part IV. 
 174.  See, e.g., KATIA FACH GÓMEZ, KEY DUTIES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATORS: 
A TRANSNATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS 173 (2019) (arguing that the 
confidentiality of deliberations works in tandem with duties of transparency to serve the legitimacy of 
investment arbitration). One could make the case that this duty is also owed to the other arbitrators on the 
tribunal, who might be able to enforce it through social sanctions (like speaking invitations) or even 
through their role in making appointments in other cases where they act as counsel or appointing 
authority. See, e.g., Draft Code, supra note 43, arts. 3, para. 25, 9.1(c). 
 175.  See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 115, art. 7; see also ICSID Proposals, 
supra note 35, r. 66, at 66–67 (listing ten types of information exempt from public disclosure). 
 176.  Cf. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 14, art. 18 (“[E]ach party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL 
& INV’R-STATE ARBITRATION § 4.18 cmt. a (“An essential feature of adjudication is that the parties be 
able to present their claims to, and have them assessed by, an impartial decisionmaker.”). 
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standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, 
and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make.177 
They describe a “multifaceted ‘global administrative space’” populated by a 
wide variety of “global administrative bodies”—public, private, and hybrid, 
formal and informal—with a range of functions, including certain 
adjudications.178 
Just as Kingsbury identified transparency and participation as core 
concerns of global administrative law, subsequent literature has stressed a 
trend towards greater respect for the interests of outsiders affected by the 
rules.  Eyal Benvenisti calls this respect “other-regardingness.”179  Ayelet 
Berman, for example, has discussed the OECD’s recommendations that 
states should “give consideration” to the impact their regulations will have 
on foreign interests and “ensure” that their rulemaking processes “provide 
opportunities for consultation with external partners.”180  Likewise, a study 
of WTO disputes concludes by emphasizing the organization’s commitment 
to other-regardingness: 
WTO adjudicators act not simply as agents of contracting states but, 
rather, as trustees of the overarching WTO regime, considering not only 
the bilateral relationship between the disputing states but also the 
collective interests related to the wider community of states of which the 
disputants form a part.  Moreover, not infrequently, though not always 
explicitly, the adjudicators go further to consider broader community 
interests and global concerns, thereby acting in various ways as trustees of 
humanity.181 
Recognizing that investment arbitrators have duties to non-parties 
dovetails with this trend towards other-regardingness in global 
administrative law.  Investment arbitrators may be seen as rule-makers, 
acting with the authority delegated to them through a system created by 
 
 177.  Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 15, 17 (2005). 
 178.  Id. at 17 n.4, 18. 
 179.  Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to 
Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 300 (2013) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 180.  Ayelet Berman, Taking Foreign Interests into Account: Rulemaking in the US and EU, 15 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 235, 254 (2017) (quoting Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Recommendation of 
the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance, at 31 (Mar. 22, 2012), http:// 
www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LR6-4LNB]). Berman observes 
that “enlightened self-interest” mainly drives regulators to take outsiders’ interests into account. Id. Given 
the crisis facing investment arbitration, it might be suggested that arbitrators’ enlightened self-interest 
impels them in the same direction. 
 181.  Agon & Benvenisti, supra note 113, at 659–60. It seems that the authors are not yet prepared 
to extend the same principle of other-regardingness to investment arbitration, not even normatively, 
suggesting that “a more fruitful ground” for that development “would be established” after the Investment 
Court under the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”) starts operating. 
Id. at 658. 
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states, whose decisions help regulate state conduct.  As such, they are part of 
a public system of governance.182  Recognizing that arbitrators have 
responsibilities to non-parties contributes to building governance systems 
that appropriately respect the interests of all affected persons. 
Other-regardingness explains why party autonomy, while vital, is not 
the supreme value of the investment arbitration system.  The system must 
work well for parties, but it also must work well for non-party stakeholders 
such as the institutions that host cases, the states that create and support the 
system, and ultimately the public those states serve.  Sometimes other-
regarding concerns weigh heavily enough to warrant curbing party 
autonomy. 
Perhaps it is most important that arbitrators themselves recognize their 
responsibility to give due respect to non-party interests.  This recognition 
could affect how arbitrators conceive and approach their job.  It could affect 
the questions they ask, the procedures they follow, the answers they reach.  
If arbitrators “deal in virtue,”183 their conception of virtue will shape their 
acts and judgments.  HEP exemplified this possibility, by prioritizing the 
legitimacy of the process over a party’s freedom to hire the counsel of its 
choice.184 
Recognition of non-party interests could also affect how arbitral 
institutions act to protect their interests, as well as systemic interests.  We 
have already seen duties that institutions create and enforce.185  Recognition 
that such duties do and should exist may help consolidate and advance this 
trend.  New duties might emerge, especially when institutions update their 
rules, and existing duties might be enforced more openly and rigorously.  
Forthright recognition could affect the ongoing debate about the appropriate 
scope of arbitrator immunity, perhaps leading the ICC to constrain immunity 
as the LCIA and SCC have done.186 Institutions should not hesitate to make 
clear their core minimum expectations for arbitrators and the consequences 
 
 182.  Kingsbury et al. mention investment arbitration, implying it is part of the global administrative 
space, a point made explicitly by Kingsbury’s later work with Schill. Kingsbury et al., supra note 177, at 
36, 47; Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 166, at 1; accord Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law 
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2360 n.71, 2401 n.283 (1991) (describing investor-state arbitration as a 
form of transnational public law litigation). 
 183.  See generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 184.  See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. 
 185.  See supra Parts II–III. 
 186.  Compare ICC Rules, supra note 13, art. 41 (affording arbitrator immunity except as “prohibited 
by applicable law”), with LCIA Rules, supra note 14, art. 31.1 (barring arbitrator liability from extending 
to parties except when there is evidence of “conscious and deliberate wrongdoing”), and SCC Rules, 
supra note 14, art. 52 (barring a finding of arbitrator liability except for acts or omissions attributable to 
“wilful misconduct or gross negligence”). 
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of breach.  And they should take those expectations into account when 
appointing arbitrators. 
Similarly, increasing recognition of arbitrators’ duties to non-parties 
might affect state behavior.  States might incorporate arbitrator codes of 
conduct in their investment treaties and in their standards and practices for 
making appointments to tribunals and institutional rosters.187  They might 
also participate more actively as non-disputing Parties in investment cases, 
as has been the practice with WTO third-party submissions,188 and encourage 
tribunals to give due respect to non-party submissions by other amici. 
Academics, practitioners, and civil society have a role, too, in shaping 
the norms and expectations for investment arbitrators.  For example, 
individuals and NGO’s are able to participate in ICSID’s and UNCITRAL’s 
project to prepare a code of conduct for investor-state disputes.189  They may 
also exert influence through their own work, such as the ALI’s 
Restatement,190 the IBA’s Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators,191 
and Catherine Rogers’ scholarship on ethics.192 
 
 187.  See Chiara Giorgetti & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Ex Pluribus Unum? On the Form and Shape of a 
Common Code of Ethics in International Litigation, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 312, 312 (2019) 
(“[W]e urge that states adopt a mandatory common code of ethics for disputes involving states, and that 
arbitral institutions adopt this code as part of their rules for administering arbitration.”). While a unified 
global approach may (or may not) lie in the future, state practice towards regulating arbitrators can already 
be seen. See, e.g., Norway Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 15, May 13, 2015, 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e47326b61f424d4c9c3d470896492623/draft-model-agreemen 
t-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VU2-AYGT] (“Members of the Tribunal shall comply with the 
International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration and any 
Code of Conduct adopted by the Joint Committee . . . .”). NAFTA has a code of conduct for trade (but 
not investment) disputes, while CETA has one for its investment court. NAFTA Code of Conduct, supra 
note 125; Committee on Services and Investment Decision No. 1/2021 of 29 Jan. 2021 O.J. (L 59) 36. 
 188.  One study counted over 6.5 third-party participants per case, although many do not make any 
submissions. Lauren Konken, Silence is Golden? Revisiting Third Party Participation in World Trade 
Organization Litigation 10 (Sept. 2018) (unpublished paper), https://www.peio.me/wp-content/ 
uploads/2019/01/PEIO12_paper_64.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RXD-VDP4] (“Looking at third party 
participants in completed disputes at the panel level and adjusting for duplicate cases yields 1140 
instances of states acting as third parties across 170 disputes filed and concluded between 1995 and 
2017.”). 
 189.  See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group III (Inv’r-State Dispute 
Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Eighth Session, ¶¶ 67–78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/1004 (Oct. 
23, 2019). 
 190.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV’R-STATE 
ARBITRATION. 
 191.  See Int’l Bar Ass’n [IBA], Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators (1987). In this regard, 
the IBA might consider this an opportune time to update its 30-year-old ethics rules, with detailed 
consideration of arbitrators’ responsibilities to parties and non-parties alike. 
 192.  See, e.g., ROGERS, supra note 19. 
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Reform is the best hope for investment arbitration in this time of crisis, 
when even its leading traditional proponents threaten to exit the system.193  
ICSID is making thoughtful efforts at reform, including the most significant 
overhaul of its arbitral rules to date.194  UNCITRAL is also coordinating a 
major reform project.195  Reform will have to be effected by the arbitrators, 
making it all the more important for states and institutions to clarify and 
uphold the duties they expect arbitrators to fulfill.196 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The fact that the investment arbitration system imposes duties on 
arbitrators for the benefit of non-parties, sometimes over the preference of 
the parties, speaks profoundly about that system.  These duties help reveal 
the system’s nature, a system more akin to public adjudication than to a 
private matter controlled solely by and for the parties. 
It is a system embedded within the overall structure of public 
international law.  It shares with international law the elemental duty of good 
faith.  The Vienna Convention describes the “principle[] of good faith” as 
“universally recognized.”197  Investment treaties, like all other treaties, must 
be performed in good faith and must be interpreted in good faith.198  Good 
faith “forms part of the foundation of the whole international legal structure,” 
an “absolutely necessary ingredient.”199  It is “a supreme principle, which 
governs legal relations in all of their aspects and content.”200  It pertains to 
 
 193.  The EU and Canada are working to replace investment arbitration with a standing investment 
court. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 8.27, Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. 
(L 11) 23. The Trump Administration moved the other way, limiting investor claims in the NAFTA 
renegotiation. See, e.g., DAVID A. GANTZ, BAKER INST. PUB. POLICY, THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO-
CANADA AGREEMENT: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (2019). 
 194.  See, e.g., Meg Kinnear, Sixth Annual Charles N. Brower Lecture on International Dispute 
Resolution: Procedure, Policy, & Progress: Seeking Consensus on ISDS Rules Reform (Apr. 5, 2018), in 
112 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L LAW ANNUAL MEETING 121 (2018). 
 195.  See generally Stephan W. Schill, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform at UNCITRAL: A 
Looming Constitutional Moment?, 19 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 1 (2018). 
 196.  The Draft Code thus missed two important opportunities. First, it omitted institutions from the 
list of persons to whom arbitrators owe their duties. See Draft Code, supra note 43, art. 3, para. 25. 
Second, it subverts other-regardingness by obliging arbitrators to “consider the best interests of the 
parties” without any counterbalancing consideration due to the interests of the public and interested non-
parties. See id. art. 8(4). 
 197.  Vienna Convention, supra note 85, pmbl. 
 198.  Id. arts. 26, 31. 
 199.  Michel Virally, Review Essay: Good Faith in Public International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 130, 
133–34 (1983); Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20) (“One of 
the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, 
is the principle of good faith.”). 
 200.  Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 230 (Aug. 2, 
2006), 17 ICSID Rep. 100 (2016). 
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international commercial law as well as public international law.201  And, to 
the point, good faith is inherent in the arbitral function.  As Bernardo 
Cremades wrote in his article on “Good Faith in International Arbitration”: 
This principle [of good faith] affects both the parties to the dispute as well 
as the arbitrators or arbitration institutions or, in general, any person 
participating in the arbitral proceeding, whether as an attorney or an 
expert. . . . [A]rbitrators and arbitration institutions must fulfill their role 
in good faith, protecting the integrity of the proceeding.202 
Embracing this principle, ICSID has proposed a new “general duty”: “The 
Tribunal and the parties shall conduct the proceeding in good faith. . ..”203 
Cremades concludes, “[T]he parties trust in the good faith of the 
arbitrators. . ..”204  This is quite right, but incomplete.  The parties trust in the 
good faith of the arbitrators and so do arbitral institutions, non-party 
participants, states, and the global public.  Arbitrators in investment cases 
owe this overriding systemic duty of good faith to everyone and it permeates 
all that they do. 
 
 
 201.  See LCIA Rules, supra note 14, art. 32.2 (“For all matters not expressly provided in the 
Arbitration Agreement, the LCIA Court, the LCIA, the Registrar, the Arbitral Tribunal and each of the 
parties shall act at all times in good faith, respecting the spirit of the Arbitration Agreement, and shall 
make every reasonable effort to ensure that any award is legally recognised and enforceable at the arbitral 
seat.”) (emphasis added); Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, art. 1.7 (2016) (“(1) Each party must act in accordance 
with good faith and fair dealing in international trade. (2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.”). 
UNIDROIT explains that the duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot be waived or limited because it 
is of “such a fundamental nature.” Id. cmt. 4. 
 202.  Bernardo M. Cremades, Good Faith in International Arbitration, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 761, 
786–87 (2012). 
 203.  ICSID Proposals, supra note 35, r. 3(1), at 33. 
 204.  Cremades, supra note 202, at 788. 
